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DIVINE OMNISCIENCE, HUMAN FREEDOM, AND
BACKWARD CAUSATION
Richard M. Gale

Many attempts have been made to deduce a contradiction from the propositions that there exists an essentially omniscient God and that some human
actions arc free. The most promising form that such a deduction takes is the
one that is directed against an omnitemporally eternal God and attempts to
deduce from this conjunction the conceptual absurdity that causation can
go backwards: If a human could have refrained from performing some
action, she has the power to backwardly cause God to have believed other
than he in fact did. An attempt is made to support the Ockhamist way out
of this argument by showing that in certain special cases causation can go
backwards. Several of John Fischer's objections to this way out are rebutted.

Many attempts have been made since Boethius's ill-fated effort to deduce a
contradiction from the conjunction of the propositions that there exists an
essentially omniscient God and that there are free creatures. One version of
such an argument that has yet to receive a decisive refutation attempts to
show that this conjunction entails the conceptual impossibility that it is
possible for causation to go backwards. This argument does not work
against a God that is timelessly rather than omnitemporally eternal, for the
argument requires that for every event that occurs God believes at every
time prior to its occurrence that it will occur. Thus, if successful, the argument gives a powerful reason for conceiving of God as timelessly eternal,
that is, as not being subject to any temporal determinations or distinctions.
Another option is to have God remain omnitemporally eternal but deny
that a prediction of a free act has a truth-value prior to its occurrence,
thereby precluding even an omniscient being from knowing it in advance.
And since an essentially omniscient being will not believe any proposition
that it does not know, God will not have any prior beliefs about this act.
The argument arbitrarily picks out some apparently free creaturely act,
say Jones's freely mowing his lawn at t" and attempts to show that this has
the consequence that Jones has the power to backwardly cause God to
have had a certain belief prior to fl. And since this is conceptually impossible, it is false that Jones freely mows his lawn. This conclusion can be generalized to every apparently free creaturely act. The argument that is to be
presented is a variant of one given by Nelson Pike.}
1. God exists. premise
2. God is essentially omniscient. by definition
3. God is omnitemporally eternal in that he exists at every moment of
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time without beginning or end. premise
For every event that occurs, God believes at every time prior to its
occurrence that it will occur. from 2 and 3
5. Jones freely mows his lawn at f2. assumption for an indirect proof
6. Jones could have refrained from mowing his lawn at b. from 5 on
the assumption that an act is freely done only if the agent can
refrain from doing it
7. It was within Jones's power at f2 to bring it about that eighty years
ago God believed other than he did. from 4 and 6
8. It is conceptually impossible that anyone have the power to bring
about a past event. Necessary truth
9. It is false that it was within Jones's power at 12 to bring it about that
eighty years ago God believed other than he did. From 8
10. It is false that Jones freely mows his lawn at t2. from 5-9 by indirect
proof
4.

Following Ockham's way out, many have denied premise 8, claiming
that in a certain type of case, of which step 7 is an instance, it is possible for
causation to run backwards. There are numerous cases in which a person
can now act so as to bring it about that a proposition about the past is false.
For example by acting as I do now (e.g., selling state secrets to a foreign
power) I bring it about that the patriots labored in vain, by pumping out
Smith's stomach that he did not take a fatal overdose, by engaging in a
great buffalo hunt that Jones had not engaged in the last great buffalo hunt,
and by making a hit that wins the game and the series for Brown's team
that Brown was not the goat of the World Series when he committed a
game-losing error in an earlier game.
What these past tense propositions have in common is that they report
what obtains during some time interval in a way that makes demands on
what happens or fails to happen at later or earlier times. They could be
called "temporally impure propositions."2 Consider a proposition of the
form "s is F." It reports what its participial nominalization, "S's Fing,"
refers to. The proposition that ItS is F" is temporally impure just in case that
S's Fing obtains during interval of time t either entails that there is a time
earlier or later than t or is not consistent with any number of occurrences of
S's Fing earlier or later than t. Thus, any proposition that reports a first or
last occurrence of S's fing will count as temporally impure as well any
proposition that reports what obtains at some interval of time that entails
that something happens or fails to happen at some earlier or later time,
which entails that there is some time earlier or later than that time.
It turns out that the propositions rand s are temporally impure by this
criterion. That God believes at tl that Jones will mow his lawn at b, unlike
the proposition that some nonomniscient being, Smith, believes this, is
temporally impure because it entails that there is a time later than tl at
which Jones mows his lawn. Surprisingly, the proposition that God exist at
tJ also is temporally impure; for it is a conceptual truth that a temporally or
omnitemporally eternal God exists at every time without beginning or end
in any world in which he exists. Thus, if God exists at a time tl, he exists at
every time later than tl. Therefore, that God exists at tl is temporally
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impure because it entails that there exists a time later than h.
It might be claimed that even though the proposition that God exists at
h is temporally impure, still it is absurd to claim that anyone could bring it
about that it is false that God exists at tJ, or that it is false that he timelessly
exists. By acting so as to bring it about that it is false that God exists at t"
one does not causally prevent God from existing but instead does something that logically precludes his existing. That I now am in Pittsburgh
does not causally prevent me from now being in San Francisco but rather
logically precludes that I am. Thus, by being in Pittsburgh now I bring it
about that I am not now in San Francisco. Now what could a free creature
do that would logically preclude God from existing? He merely need freely
do something that is so evil that it logically precludes God's existing, such
as bringing about that all sentient beings, of which there is a great multitude, forever exist in the most horrendous state of pain and misery. This
logically precludes God's existing, since God, in virtue of having middle
knowledge of what created free people will do, would not allow this to
happen. Or, even if he does not have middle knowledge, at a certain point
he would intercede so as to eliminate this great suffering.
John Martin Fischer has argued with great ingenuity that if we permit
someone to bring about a temporally impure proposition about the past, we
must also permit her to do so for a temporally pure one; but, since we do not
want to permit the latter, we must not permit the former, thereby destroying
the Ockhamist rebuttal of Pike's argument. 3 There are two different alleged
ways in which this occurs. In the first case, there is a temporally impure
proposition that logically entails a temporally pure one. For example, that
God believed at tJ that p logically entails by Existential Generalization that
someone believed at tl that p. Fischer could then urge that if Jones at h can
bring it about that God believed at f, that p, he can bring it about that someone believed at tJ that p, since the former entails the latter. The latter is a temporally pure proposition, and thus in bringing about the former temporally
impure proposition one also brings about the latter.
My response to this reductio ad absurdum objection is as follows. I take it
without argument, though I am prepared to argue the matter, that "causes
it to be the case," "brings it about," and "explains" create opaque contexts
and thereby take abstract propositions as their relata, which is fitting since
what is needed in an opaque context is a sense (which is what a proposition is) or concept. Because "brings it about" creates an opaque context, it is
not closed under deduction. If it were closed under deduction, it would
follow that, since a necessary proposition is entailed by any proposition, I
can bring about that 2+2=4 if 1 can bring it about that any proposition is
true.
The second case involves two coreporting propositions (propositions
whose participial nominalization are coreferring), one of which is temporally impure and the other of which is temporally pure. Let's assume that
God is Bob's favorite object. This has the consequence that the proposition
that God believe at h that p, although not identical with, is coreporting
with the proposition that Bob's favorite object at tl believed p. The latter is
temporally pure. But, Fischer would urge, if it is conceptually possible to
bring about the former, the same must also hold for the latter.
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Because "brings it about" creates an opaque context, we shouldn't
expect that coreporting propositions are inter-substitutible salva veritate.
Thus, it cannot be inferred from the proposition that Jones can bring it
about at b that God believed at tl that p that Jones can bring it about at b that
Bob's favorite object at tl believed that p. But why we should prefer one
propositional way of describing the event of God's believing p at h over the
other? I have no answer to this question, since it rests on context-sensitive
considerations. But for the purpose of Pike's atheological argument it must
be the proposition that God believed at tl that p that is employed, for he
could not derive any freedom-canceling conclusion if his argument uses the
proposition that Bob's favorite object att! believed that p.
Another one of Fischer's examples assumes the quite dubious proposition that God camlot have a belief unless his mind is in some sort of representational state. Let us assume that God's believing that p involves as one
of its mereological parts God's mind being in representation state s. God's
believing at h that p is identical with God's mind at tl being in representational state s. Therefore, the proposition that God believed at h that pis coreporting with the proposition that God's mind at h was in representational
state S. The latter, unlike the former, is temporally pure. But if Jones at b can
bring about the former he can also do so for the latter, the reason being that
if a person can bring about a given proposition, he can bring about any
proposition that is co-reporting with it. However, this latter principle-that
"bring it about" is closed under co-reporting propositions-has nothing to
recommend it. Consider the proposition that at h Jones is dancing the first
day of a two day dance. This is a paradigm temporally impure proposition.
It is conceptually possible for someone subsequently to tl to falsify it by
killing Jones so that he cannot go on dancing. Yet the event of Jones's dancing at b the first day of a two day dance is identical with the event of Jones's
dancing at h. And thus the proposition that Jones dances at tl the first day of
a two day dance is co-reporting with the proposition that Jones dances at tl.
But it would be unreasonable to demand that one can bring it about that the
former is false only if he can bring it about that the latter also is false.
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NOTES
1. "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action," Philosophical Review, 74
(1965),27-46.
2. The account that I will give of them is a refinement on the one I gave in
The Language of Time (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968). This, in tum,
was a refinement upon my initial effort in "Pure and Impure Descriptions," in
the Australasian Journal of Philosophy for 1967.
3. See especially Chapter 6 in his The Metaphysics of Free Will (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1994). I have taken the liberty of reformulating his objection in terms
of my pure-impure proposition distinction rather than in terms of his hard-soft
fact distinction. There are some differences betw'een these distinctions, but they
do not affect any of the points that will be made.

